

Gaza War and Genocide, and its Palestinian and Regional Implications

Transnational Relations, Migrations, and Energy Insecurity

Comprehensive Report

Based on the presentation delivered at the University of Granada, November 20, 2025

TRACHMED Project

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About This Report

This report reorganizes and expands, in narrative form, the content of a presentation titled “Gaza War and Genocide, and its Palestinian and Regional Implications: Transnational Relations, Migrations, and Energy Insecurity,” delivered by Samir Aita, President of the Cercle des Economistes Arabes, at the University of Granada on November 20, 2025, as part of the TRACHMED project.

The presentation draws on data attributed to sources including UNOSAT/UNITAR, the Gaza Ministry of Health and related casualty tracking, UNHCR, UNDESA, and satellite/imagery analysis platforms such as Forensic Architecture, alongside the author’s own regional analysis.

Executive Summary

Between October 2023 and October 2025, the presentation reports 67,000 Palestinians killed and 169,000 injured in Gaza, alongside the destruction or severe damage of 140,000 housing units by October 2025, rising to 81% of all structures (320,622 units) damaged by October 31, 2025. Some 2.1 million people — 95% of Gaza's population — have been displaced. Damage assessments extend into the northern West Bank, where camps including Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nur Shams show extensive housing and road destruction.

For the Palestinians, the presentation frames the post-war period around unresolved questions of reconstruction, governance, and self-determination: UN Security Council Resolution 2803 envisions a foreign “Board of Peace” and “International Stabilization Force” with no effective Palestinian or UN participation and no reference to a two-state solution, which the presentation reads as risking continued foreign and Israeli occupation rather than Palestinian self-governance.

Regionally, the presentation traces how the Gaza war catalyzed the Israel–Lebanon war and the weakening of Hezbollah, direct Israel–Iran military confrontation culminating in a joint Israeli–US strike on Iranian nuclear sites (June 2025), and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, followed by a fragile transition marked by sectarian massacres and a rapid US-led rehabilitation of the new Syrian authorities. Gulf states, Turkey, and Egypt are shown holding divergent and often contradictory positions toward Israel, Iran, Hamas, and the proposed International Stabilization Force.

The report's final section situates these events within longer-run structural drivers of regional fragility that the presentation argues will outlast any ceasefire: a demographic “youth tsunami,” repeated waves of forced migration, chronic informal employment, and persistent energy insecurity across the Eastern Mediterranean.

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1. The Gaza War and Genocide: Death Toll and Destruction

1.1 The Death Toll (October 2023 – October 2025)

Over the two years spanning October 2023 to October 2025, the presentation documents a catastrophic human toll in the Gaza Strip:

- 67,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza — approximately 3% of the total population (with thousands more believed to remain under the rubble)
- 169,000 Palestinians injured — approximately 7% of the total population
- 125 hospitals and clinics damaged
- 1,722 health and aid workers killed
- One child in four suffers from severe malnutrition




Figure 1. Monthly and cumulative Palestinian fatalities in Gaza, October 2023–October 2025, with key phases and events annotated.

The presentation breaks the death toll into two annual phases:

Phase I: October 2023 – October 2024

This first year saw the deadliest single months of the war, beginning with the October 7 attack and the immediate massive Israeli airstrike campaign, followed by the expansion of strikes, siege, and preparations for a ground invasion; major ground operations in northern Gaza; the shift of fighting south to Khan Younis; and the deepening of the humanitarian crisis as Rafah became a new focal point for displaced civilians. By the one-year mark, cumulative deaths stood in the tens of thousands, with the pace of killing beginning to slow even as displacement and infrastructure destruction continued.

Phase II: October 2024 – October 2025

The second year is characterized by continued military presence and further destruction of infrastructure, international pressure for a ceasefire, and a prolonged stalemate in which Gaza remained in humanitarian collapse. A sharp escalation is recorded from May 2025 onward, described in the presentation as a “Gaza offensive” that produced several months with over 3,000 deaths each, before a decline coinciding with the announcement of a Trump-brokered Israel–Hamis ceasefire agreement.

1.2 The Scale of Destruction

The presentation traces the systemic destruction of housing and infrastructure in Gaza through four snapshots:

Date	Units Destroyed or Severely Damaged
October 31, 2023	4,000
May 31, 2024	53,000
December 2024	80,000
October 2025	140,000

Source: presentation slides citing UNOSAT/UNITAR satellite-based damage assessments.




Figure 2. UNOSAT/UNITAR imagery-based damage assessment maps of the Gaza Strip, October 2023–October 2025.

A more detailed comprehensive damage assessment as of October 31, 2025 indicates that 81% of all building structures in Gaza are damaged — a total of 320,622 units — broken down as follows:

Damage Category	Number of Structures
Destroyed structures (+18% vs. July 2025)	123,464
Severely damaged structures	17,116
Moderately damaged structures	33,857
Possibly damaged structures	23,836

Source: UNOSAT Comprehensive Damage Assessment, October 31, 2025, cited in the presentation.




Figure 3. Rafah city, Rafah Governorate — comparative satellite imagery, October 2023 vs. July 2024, alongside the UNOSAT October 2025 comprehensive damage overview map.

1.3 Displacement of the Population

The presentation documents that systemic destruction has been accompanied by mass displacement: 2.1 million Palestinians — 95% of the population of Gaza — have been displaced. It describes the population as having been pushed into a shifting “humanitarian zone,” first pushed away from the Egyptian border and later away from Gaza City, through what is characterized in the presentation as the weaponization of evacuation orders and “safe zones.” It references the Forensic Architecture investigation “A Cartography of Genocide” (forensic-architecture.org) as a resource mapping this process.



Figure 4. Shrinking space for Gaza's displaced population and the shifting “humanitarian zone,” alongside proposed Israeli withdrawal lines under the Trump ceasefire plan.

2. The War Beyond Gaza: The West Bank

The presentation emphasizes that the conflict has not been confined to Gaza. A UNOSAT assessment from October 2025 covering three refugee camps in the northern West Bank — Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nur Shams — documents damage to housing, damage to roads, and a broader security assessment of these areas.

Example: Jenin Camp

A UNOSAT comprehensive damage assessment of Jenin Camp, based on satellite imagery from October 16, 2025 compared with imagery from May 21, 2025, identified:

- 201 destroyed structures
- 117 severely damaged structures
- 358 moderately damaged structures
- A total of 676 damaged structures, representing around 52% of all structures in the camp



Figure 5. UNOSAT comprehensive damage assessment, Jenin Camp, West Bank — imagery collected October 16, 2025.

Example: Nur Shams Camp

At Nur Shams Camp, the security assessment documents both damaged roads and roads that have been deliberately widened, alongside continued bulldozer activity, based on imagery and reporting collected through July and October 2025.

3. Implications for the Palestinians

3.1 The Future of Gaza

Before the war, Gaza is described as having functioned as a closed prison for 2.5 million people, with little access to the West Bank, Israel, or Egypt, but where a minimum level of livelihood was maintained. It was governed by Hamas following local elections — a situation that partly resulted from earlier Israeli and Qatari policies aimed at weakening the PLO.

Today, by contrast, the population lives in tents in a smaller portion of the territory. Several open questions are raised about what comes next:

- What will reconstruction look like — and for whom? There is a contrast between the Trump-proposed “Riviera” vision for Gaza and the idea of Gaza remaining a living place for the Palestinians themselves.
- With livelihoods currently sustained only by massive humanitarian aid, what perspectives exist for Gaza’s young population?
- How will the population heal from its wounds and devastation?

On governance, the presentation notes that, per UN Security Council Resolution 2803, authority over post-war Gaza is envisioned to be exercised through a foreign “Board of Peace” and an “International Stabilization Force,” without effective participation by the Palestinians or the UN, and without reference to a two-state solution. It questions which countries will actually participate in this Stabilization Force, and concludes that the arrangement, as designed, risks: pushing the Palestinians further away from decision-making over their own territory; constituting a foreign military occupation; and allowing continuing Israeli occupation of a portion of Gaza’s land.

3.2 The Symbolism of Gaza

However, Gaza must be situated within a much longer historical and symbolic frame:

Anthedon

Some scholars has used Anthedon as a symbol for the future of the Gaza strip. Anthedon, described as the “flower Hellenistic city” built by the Greeks near Gaza, was destroyed during the Jewish-Roman wars, later developed under the Syrian Severan emperors, and had bishops who participated in the church councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Jerusalem. This ancient history holds no particular meaning to the present Palestinian population — in implicit contrast to Rafah, below.

Rafah (Rafia)

In opposition, Rafah is a historical symbol of peace and unification between Syria and Egypt: the site of the wedding between Cleopatra I (“Syra,” the Syrian goddess, daughter of Antiochus III the Great of the Seleucid Empire and Queen Laodice III) and Ptolemy V Epiphanes, Pharaoh of Egypt. Cleopatra I later ruled Egypt as regent for her young son, Ptolemy VI, in a reign characterized by peace with the Seleucid Empire and continued neutrality with Rome.

It is also to be noted that Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, is buried in Gaza — a further layer of religious and historical significance attached to the territory.




Figure 6. Cleopatra I as a symbol for peace and unification

3.3 The Future of Palestine

Zooming out from Gaza to the wider Palestinian question, the presentation sets out the current demographic balance: the West Bank and Israeli settlements are home to roughly 3.2 million Palestinians and 0.5 million Israeli settlers, while Israel as a whole has approximately 6.5 million Jewish citizens alongside 2.0 million Palestinian citizens.

Against this backdrop, one questions what a “two-state solution” can still mean in the present context, arguing that:

- International recognition of a Palestinian state comes late relative to the demographic changes and “facts on the ground” already established through settlement expansion
- Such recognition, as currently framed, avoids naming the underlying situation as “apartheid”

This is while one wonders if **a single state with equal rights for all inhabitants is, in fact, “the real solution.”**

4. Regional Implications

4.1 Lebanon

Lebanon entered the Gaza war already in a position of weak governance and economic fragility, dating to its 2019 financial collapse — described as one of the worst financial crises in modern history — raising the question of what further foreign pressures this crisis has invited.

The new Israel–Lebanon war goes through five phases:

- I. Hezbollah began Tit-for-Tat exchanges with Israel in solidarity with Gaza (October 2023)
- II. Gradual escalation of the conflict (November 2023 – January 2024), spilling beyond the border and displacing populations
- III. Targeted assassinations and deep strikes on strategic assets on both sides (February – June 2024)
- IV. The “full war” (July – November 2024), including the explosion of Hezbollah pagers (September 17, 2024) and the killing of Hassan Nasrallah (September 27, 2024)
- V. A fragile ceasefire (from November 27, 2024 to the present), under which Israel continues to occupy strategic land in South Lebanon despite an agreed 60-day withdrawal notice, and continues near-daily targeted assassinations inside Lebanon

The Lebanese army is tasked with dismantling both Hezbollah’s military capabilities and Palestinian military forces in refugee camps (estimated at 250,000 people) before the end of 2025, with the threat of a new Israeli war on Lebanon if this is not accomplished. The UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL is set to withdraw by the end of 2026.

On displacement, around 1.2 million people — one-fifth of Lebanon’s population — were displaced during the 2023-2024 conflict. Of these, roughly 400,000 went to Syria (including 200,000 Syrian refugees returning home, representing one-eighth of the Syrian refugees previously hosted in Lebanon), while around 60,000 Israelis were also displaced from northern Israel during the same period.




Figure 7. Damaged structures and conflict-related displacement in Lebanon by district, with total IDPs recorded as of September 2024.

Furthermore, major US and Israeli political and financial pressures were exerted on Lebanon, channeled in particular through US special envoy Tom Barrack, aimed at dismantling Hezbollah, pushing Lebanon toward direct negotiations with Israel, and applying financial pressure, including the possibility of sanctions.

4.2 Iran

The Israel–Iran confrontation has escalated from a long-standing proxy conflict into direct confrontation, through the following stages:

- First direct conflict: an Israeli strike on IRGC personnel in Damascus (April 1, 2024), followed by a major Iranian drone, ballistic missile, and cruise missile strike on Israel (April 13–14, 2024)
- Following the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Iran launched 180–200 ballistic missiles at Israeli territory (October 1, 2024)
- Israel struck Iranian missile sites in retaliation (October 26, 2024)
- A major joint Israel–US strike on Iran (June 2025), involving some 200 aircraft, drones, and missiles, targeting nuclear sites and other facilities
- A subsequent ceasefire

4.3 Syria

The fall of the Assad regime has to be situated within Syria’s broader 14-year conflict, during which the country endured some of the most severe international economic sanctions imposed on any state, leaving over 80% of the population below the poverty line, and generating one of the largest migration crises in the world: 7 million internally displaced persons and 6 million refugees, out of a pre-war population of 24 million. The country remained divided between areas of control held by the Government of Syria (GoS), Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Turkey, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The Toppling of Assad

The toppling of Assad came out of a tightly compressed timeline, linked to the Gaza war:

- Netanyahu accepted the Lebanon ceasefire and, on the same date, threatened Assad (November 27, 2023 in the slide sequence, alongside the launch of HTS’s “liberation” war)
- HTS and SDF forces captured Aleppo (November 29, 2024)
- Major fighting in Hama and Homs accompanied the dismantling of the Syrian army (December 6, 2024)
- Southern opposition forces entered Damascus (December 7, 2024)
- HTS captured Homs and entered Damascus (December 8, 2024)
- Israel carried out hundreds of strikes on former Syrian army bases and depots (December 10, 2024), while moving to control areas beyond the demilitarized 1974 buffer zone and establishing a new “safety” perimeter
- Ahmad al-Sharaa was named interim President by the fighting factions (January 29, 2025)
- An uprising in the coastal area was accompanied by massacres of Alawites (March 2025)
- Donald Trump met al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia and announced the lifting of sanctions (May 2025)
- Massacres of Druze took place in Sweida (July 2025)

- Al-Sharaa was received at the White House and Syria joined the international coalition against terrorism (November 2025), with Syria now expected to fight Daesh (ISIS), Hezbollah, and Hamas

Also to be noted the continuing pressure on the roughly 450,000 Palestinian refugees still remaining in Syria, and Israel's territorial expansion into southern Syria, breaching the formerly UN-monitored demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights and establishing a wider declared "area of influence."




Figure 8. Regional distribution of Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees from Syria, and internally displaced persons across neighboring countries.

Refugees and Returns

UNHCR-sourced figures on the Syrian displacement crisis reports: 4,859,908 registered Syrian refugees (including 29,000 registered in North African countries) and an estimated 110,000 Palestine refugees from Syria in neighboring countries, Egypt, and Europe, alongside 6.3 million internally displaced persons and 280,000 internally displaced Palestinian refugees within Syria.

Between December 2024 and October 2025, a striking reversal of these flows was observed: approximately 1.8 million IDPs returned (roughly one-quarter of the total), and around 1 million refugees returned, mainly from Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon (also roughly one-quarter of those hosted in neighboring countries).

4.4 The Gulf Countries

Qatar

Qatar is a major backer of Hamas, with its Al Jazeera network providing roughly 90% coverage of the Gaza war; it has served as the main negotiator with Israel despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, and maintains normal relations with Iran. Despite this mediating role, Israel struck a Hamas leader inside Qatar

(September 9, 2025), an act the presentation questions in terms of its justification. Qatar may join the proposed International Stabilization Force, though Israel's position on this is uncertain.

United Arab Emirates

The UAE is a major opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, with normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords and ongoing commercial and financial relations with Iran. The UAE has stated it will not join the International Stabilization Force.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is likewise an opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. It has no formal relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords framework, while it is pressured by the US to be the potential main candidate for future normalization. Its relations with Iran are minimal, with Iran presented as the kingdom's principal regional foe. Saudi Arabia has made no clear statement on joining the International Stabilization Force.

4.5 Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq

Turkey

Turkey's government is described as close to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, vocal against Israel while nonetheless maintaining continuous commercial relations with it, and maintaining normal relations with Iran alongside substantial bilateral trade. Israel has refused Turkish participation in the International Stabilization Force.

Egypt

Egypt is opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood while still maintaining relations with Hamas; it has normalized peace relations with Israel, including commercial ties, and has newly retrieved relations with Iran. Egypt is expected to lead the International Stabilization Force, though Israel's acceptance of this role is presented as an open question.

Iraq

Iraq remains unstable and subject to both US and Iranian influence, with no relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords framework, and no clear statement on joining the International Stabilization Force.

4.6 A Summary of Regional Alignments

The presentation summarizes cross-cutting relations among regional and emerging powers with respect to the two most contested actors, Israel and Iran:

- Military and security cooperation with Israel: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar
- Formal diplomatic relations with Israel: UAE, Turkey
- Unofficial relations with Israel: Qatar, Saudi Arabia
- Trade relations with Israel: Turkey, UAE (Qatar and Saudi Arabia marked as uncertain)
- Iran, by contrast, has no diplomatic, security, or military cooperation with Israel, while maintaining diplomatic and trade relations with essentially every other regional actor shown

The presentation also situates these dynamics within a broader typology of regional actors, distinguishing:

- Conflicting regional powers: Israel, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Morocco
- Fragile states: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, and Palestine
- States with limited regional power projection: Egypt, Algeria
- Outsiders to these dynamics: Oman, Jordan

(The presentation references the author's related publication, Samir Aita, "Fragile States in the Middle East and North Africa," AFD, March 2024, for further background.)

5. Implications Beyond the Region

The endgame of the Gaza war is shaped substantially by what Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu want for the region: on the Palestinian file, directly by Trump and Netanyahu; on Lebanon and Syria, primarily through US special envoy Tom Barrack. This can be illustrated with reference to a widely circulated image of Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly holding up two contrasting maps — one labeled “the curse,” depicting Iran and its regional allies, and the other labeled “the blessing,” depicting a corridor of economic and infrastructure integration running from Europe through Israel, the Gulf, and onward to India (the IMEC corridor launched during the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023, to counter the Chinese Road and Belts corridors).



Figure 9. Benjamin Netanyahu displaying contrasting maps at the UN General Assembly: “the curse” (Iran and its allies) and “the blessing” (a proposed corridor linking Europe, Israel, the Gulf, and India).

6. Keys for Perspectives

6.1 Transnational Relations

Palestine is positioned within several overlapping transnational meanings:

- Palestine as a symbol of humanity
- Palestine as a symbol of Arab identity — raising the question of whether meaningful Arab solidarity still exists, what role the Arab League plays (compared with the European Union), and if the Gulf Cooperation Council is still relevant
- The broader questioning of national identities across surrounding countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, cutting across communal divides (Sunni/Shia, Druze, Alawite, Yazidi, Ismaili, and others) and ethnic divides (Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, and others)
- Palestine as a symbol for equal citizenship, raising questions about the place of religion in the state, and whether the Abraham Accords represent genuine inter-religious dialogue or, rather, a form of state-building premised on equal citizenship
- Palestine as a symbol for the fate of refugees more broadly, and the unresolved question of the right of return

However, the Arab world today is far removed from the pan-Arab perspectives that characterized the 1950s–1970s period. The regional mechanisms are characterized by emerging medium regional powers (Israel, Türkiye, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar) conflicting over the control of fragile states (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Palestine), with two countries neutralized with no power (Egypt and Algeria) and two other countries playing as outsiders (Oman and Jordan). The competition between the emerging medium powers sees differentiated cooperation and conflict functions of the targeted fragile state. Israel and Iran are the focal players of this new "game of nations".

6.2 Migrations as a Factor of Fragilization

A demographic mechanism, identified as a “youth tsunami”, acts as a structural driver of state fragility of many countries across the region: the post-war improvements in health produced a “baby boom,” which some two decades later generated a pronounced “youth bulge” in the early 2000s. Combined with accelerating rural-to-urban migration, this produced a “youth tsunami” in Arab cities, with urban population growth exceeding 8% annually in places — a demographic phenomenon that is comparable to Europe's experience between 1945 and 1970, but without the three decades of sustained economic growth that accompanied Europe's transition.

On top of this demographic pressure, several major migration flows have repeatedly destabilized regional states:

- Palestinian refugees across Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and historically Kuwait
- Sudanese and other refugees in Egypt
- Labor migration to the Gulf states, drawing from both other Arab states and the Indian subcontinent
- Syrian refugees across Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt
- African refugees transiting Tunisia and Libya, en route to Europe

- And, most recently, Lebanese refugees displaced by the 2024 war

These external flows have been compounded by large-scale internal displacement within multiple countries.





Figure 10. Evolution of the youth share (15–24) of the working-age population, and evolution of the urban population share, across Arab countries, 1950–2050 (UNDESA).

6.3 Informal Employment as a Factor of Fragilization

These same migration patterns are linked to structurally high levels of informal employment across Arab labor markets, as shown by the data on the distribution of informal employment (informal own-account work, informal salaried work, precarious informal salary, contributing family workers, and similar categories) as a share of total employment across a range of countries, alongside each country's position on a broader “Decent Work and Economic Growth” index relative to GDP per capita. The clear implication drawn is that weak formal labor-market institutions, high informality, and low GDP per capita reinforce one another and compound state fragility.





Figure 11. SDG8 “Decent Work and Economic Growth” index against GDP per capita (PPP), and the distribution of informal employment categories as a share of total employment, across Arab countries.

6.4 Energy Insecurity

The competition between the emerging medium powers is also to be perceived in light of the energy potential of the region and the insecurity of its production and transportation to other high consuming regions.

Gaza: Oil, Gas, and Electricity

Focusing on Gaza, its pre-war energy dependency is flagrant: as of January–September 2023, only 17% of Gaza's electricity supply came from its own power plant, 28% was imported directly from Israel, and 55% represented an unmet energy deficit. Fuel for Gaza's power plant, funded by Qatar, was purchased from Israel and transported into Gaza via the Kerem Shalom crossing — a crossing that has often been closed. The Rafah crossing with Egypt, by contrast, allowed limited aid through but little to no fuel.

Eastern Mediterranean: Oil, Gas, and Electricity

Gaza's energy insecurity can also be situated within a wider regional picture of energy interdependence and competition across the Eastern Mediterranean, raising a series of open questions:

- Lebanon's endemic, long-running energy crisis
- Syria's prospects for recovering baseline energy generation and electricity supply post-conflict
- Whether Egypt will function primarily as an importer or an exporter of gas and electricity going forward
- Why Iraq, despite its resources, has not become a net exporter of gas and electricity
- The evolving role of the Gulf countries in Eastern Mediterranean energy markets and infrastructure

The regional gas infrastructure maps, including Turkish gas pipeline networks, the Arab Gas Pipeline running from Egypt through Jordan and Syria toward Turkey, and offshore gas fields and pipeline proposals across Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria — show clearly that control over, and access to, this infrastructure remains a live strategic variable in the region's conflicts or stabilization.




Figure 12. Selected energy infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean: gas fields, pipelines, and terminals across Cyprus, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt.

7. Concluding Remarks

Taken as a whole, the Gaza war and its human and material toll cannot be understood in isolation. It positions the conflict as both a humanitarian catastrophe in its own right — measured in tens of thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of injuries, and the near-total destruction of housing stock across Gaza — and as a trigger and accelerant for a cascade of related regional crises: the war with Lebanon and the weakening of Hezbollah; direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran; the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and its uncertain aftermath, including new massacres of religious minorities; and a realignment of Gulf, Turkish, and Egyptian positioning around a proposed post-war governance structure for Gaza that, as designed, offers limited direct Palestinian participation.

These political and military developments tie back to long-run structural drivers: state fragility of some regional countries — demographic pressure from “youth tsunami,” large and repeated migration and refugee flows, chronic informal employment, and persistent energy insecurity — and violent competition between emerging regional powers to control the fragilized states. These transnational forces will continue to shape the trajectory of Palestine and its surrounding states long after any formal ceasefire or reconstruction plan is agreed.

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- Additional press and open-source imagery credited in the presentation, including Deutsche Welle, Xinhua, and Mondoweiss