This report is the result of a secondment undertaken as a member of Le Cercle des Economistes Arabes at the Arab Forum for Alternatives (AFA) within the framework of the EU-funded TRACHMED project.

ABSTRACT

This paper assesses the infrastructure and security readiness of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in 2026 through its four principal pillars: transport and logistics, digital and data connectivity, energy integration, and defense and security cooperation. It distinguishes between operational assets, projects under development, and initiatives that remain largely prospective, while examining how the participating actors’ divergent strategic interests and sources of political legitimacy shape the corridor’s evolution. The analysis finds that IMEC does not yet constitute an integrated, end-to-end transport corridor. Its principal physical constraint is the absence of a continuous and interoperable railway linking the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean, compounded by limited gateway capacity, transshipment requirements, border procedures and regional insecurity. Digital connectivity is the most advanced pillar, although genuine resilience requires route diversification, protected landing points, independent terrestrial backhaul and secure data infrastructure. Selected energy assets also offer near-term potential, while proposed hydrogen, ammonia and electricity interconnection projects remain dependent on investment, regulatory coordination, commercial viability and political stability. Security arrangements are fragmented among naval missions, bilateral partnerships and infrastructure-protection initiatives and do not amount to a corridor-wide security architecture. The paper concludes that IMEC is better understood as an uneven portfolio of nationally driven projects – or a potential Indo-Mediterranean resilience framework – than as an operational transcontinental corridor. Its transformation into a coherent regional structure will depend not only on infrastructure investment but also on institutional coordination, political legitimacy, regional consent and the – now difficult – reconciliation of competing strategic interests.

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or endorsement of the Cercle des Economistes Arabes or the Arab Forum for Initiatives. The content is the sole responsibility of the author.